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OPEN DISCUSSION
THE CHAIRMAN: Comments?
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: I have a question that came up in
Amsterdam. Actually, I know one of the other things that is going
on-one of the other elements besides personality theory is the winnertake-all lottery or the prospecting function of copyright law. Kitch
talked about the prospecting function of patent law; I think it goes on
in copyright law, it is part of my theory. And then, in Amsterdam, Ian
McKaay, who is working up a general theory of information, also quite
independently started talking about the winner-take-all effect as a
counter to risk aversion in regard to a general information law. Part of
the problem is, you do not know what you are doing when you start
innovating or creating, and that is the difference about intellectual
property. It goes back to some things that were said byPROFESSOR GORDON: Can I slow you down for a second?
The first thing you were talking about was the Kitch theory. That I
think makes a lot of sense. Let me just outline Kitch's theory as it
applies here for the people who have not read it.
It is true that copyright protects some things which are very easy
to make. And a policymaker informed about prisoner's dilemma would
be surprised by that because the prisoner's dilemma analysis suggests
one should protect where a high cost of creation makes engaging in
creativity a risky occupation. Patent law has the same surprising pattern-it protects even accidental discoveries. Again that does not seem
to match the prisoner's dilemma model where you have a high cost of
creation. One explanation sometimes proffered for these aspects of the
law-well, I do not suppose anyone has made it formally, but it is latent in the Kitch literature-is this: Even though you may not need to
encourage investments in creation in a case where creation is easy, you
may want to give legal rights to encourage investment in the exploitation of the product. For example, if you cannot give somebody a patent
for something created by accident, then they will not have an incentive
to develop it and this wonderful accidental discovery may fall by the
wayside.
I probably understand that and I think that that is a very good
point, but I do not understand where you were going with it.
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: For sure, the market determines the
value and we do not know the value in the artistic-I am talking about
artistic-yields, and, therefore, there are risks in the dissemination that
are overcome by the lottery or sweepstakes effect. In this sense, the
artistic creator prospects-explores-the public's taste in the pursuit of
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a lucky strike. He knows he is going to lose on most of his investments
in literary and artistic work, but he also knows that the payoff will be
big if he makes a lucky strike because he can extract the payoff from
all uses of the work. This is the long run incentive. The artist and his
investors are competing in this very strange market where they may
possibly win a very big payoff. Now, I think that any one of these theories by themselves are insufficient, but I do not think that you can
marry the prospecting function to personality and it makes some very
interesting results-even though personality is not dependent on the
prospecting function. That is why McKaay struck uponPROFESSOR GORDON: Ian McKaay?
PROFESSOR REICHMAN: Ian McKaay. He is thinking about
it in terms of general information, then, but I think it will explain a lot
about the interest to disseminate, to exploit in the artistic area.
PROFESSOR GORDON: I take all of these comments by way of
friendly amendment, because the point is not that prisoner's dilemma
answers everything, but that the clearer we are about that particular
argument-which is so dominant in intellectual property discussion yet
remains unidentified-the clearer we are about how it needs to be supplemented or what its flaws are.
Just to mention one flaw that Dennis [Karjala] mentions implicitly
in his paper. He talks about the value added effect-the creative person
whose costs of copying, however great they are, turn an existing work
into something that is really wonderful. Prisoner's dilemma only captures the two parties' interests. It does not necessarily capture the societal interest. So all of these things are ways of building a much more
complex model than the one that prisoner's dilemma analysis can
capture.
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